Three Orientations and Four ‘Sins’ in Comparative Studies by Mou, Bo
San Jose State University
SJSU ScholarWorks
Faculty Publications Philosophy
October 2002
Three Orientations and Four ‘Sins’ in Comparative
Studies
Bo Mou
San Jose State University, bo.mou@sjsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/phil_pub
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by
an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@sjsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bo Mou. "Three Orientations and Four ‘Sins’ in Comparative Studies" APA Newsletters (2002): 42-45.
 — APA Newsletter, Fall 2002, Volume 02, Number 1 — 
Three Orientations and Four ‘Sins’ in 
Comparative Studies 
Bo Mou 
San Jose State University 
Without pretending to exhaust all working orientations, I intend 
to highlight three major orientations and their distinct 
methodological approaches in comparative studies whose due 
examination, in my opinion, would be most helpful for a 
constructive development of comparative philosophy.1  I plan 
to do this by discussing the appropriateness of four ‘sins’ that 
are oft-cited in critically evaluating a comparative project. The 
reason that I take this strategy is this: the appropriateness or 
legitimacy of the four ‘sins’ depends on the purpose and 
orientation of a comparative project that would decisively 
determine which kind of methodological approach should be 
taken and what kind of expectations are appropriate; the 
strategy is an effective way to identify how crucial aspects and 
purposes of those orientations and approaches are distinct 
and so, in treating one’s own comparative project or critically 
evaluating some other ’s comparative project, to be more 
sensitive to its distinct purpose and orientation and thus to 
what it is appropriate to expect.2 
When comparative projects are critically evaluated, there 
seem to be four sorts of complaint. The alleged ‘sins’ are these: 
(1) over-simplification; (2) over-use of external resources; 
(3) exaggerated distinction; and (4) blurring assimilation. They, 
or some of them, are sometimes taken for granted in two 
senses: first, it is thought that any simplifying the object of study 
or using external resources to characterize it are doomed to 
be excessive and thus deserve to be charged with negative 
‘over ’-character; second, it is assumed that the four complaints 
may be made indiscriminately in evaluating any comparative 
project without regard to the orientation and methodological 
strategy of that study. A metaphilosophical examination of the 
four ‘sins’ will help to effectively identify the distinct character 
and objectives of a variety of orientations and their approaches. 
1. Historical orientation aiming at historical 
description 
The first orientation under examination aims to give a historical 
and descriptive account. That is, the primar y concern and 
purpose of this type of comparative study is to accurately 
describe relevant historical matters of facts and pursue what 
thinkers in comparison actually thought, what resources were 
actually used (by them), and what appear to be similar and 
different. The orientation of this type of comparative study thus 
might be called ‘historical orientation,’ and its methodological 
approach aims at accurate description of historical matters of 
fact. The historical orientation requires its practitioners to cover 
a vast range of historical data to give such ‘factual’ description. 
It seems that this orientation and its cor responding 
methodological approach are typically taken in Chinese 
studies or Sinology as the primar y approach to Chinese and 
comparative philosophy; they are also taken by some scholars 
in the field of philosophy. 
There is no wonder that the aforementioned four oft-cited 
‘sins’ would be assumed relevant to those comparative 
projects with the historical orientation. First, to accurately 
describe something, it is taken for granted that one should not 
simplif y what is actually complicated; in other words, 
simplification is always oversimplification: any simplification 
is guilty of being negatively excessive; and simplification is thus 
identical with falsification. Second, as for over-use of external 
resources, any conceptual or explanatory resources which are 
used to interpret a thinker’s idea under examination but were 
not actually used by the thinker herself are rendered 
inadequate or excessive: use of external resources is always 
over-use of external resources. Third, in this approach, 
exaggerated distinctness often results from over-simplification 
of one or both parties under comparative examination in the 
direction of ignoring part(s) in one tradition or account that 
would share something in common in another tradition or 
account; in this way, insofar as the sin of over-simplification 
has been already legitimately charged, the charge of 
exaggeration of the due distinction (if any) between the two 
would be appropriate. Fourth, in this approach, blur ring 
assimilation often results from over-use of external resources 
to interpret one or both parties under comparative 
examination, especially when the external resources used to 
characterize one party come from the other party; to this extent, 
insofar as the sin of over-use of external resources has been 
already legitimately charged, the resulting assimilation of 
blur ring the distinction between the two would be also 
adequately charged. 
There would be nothing wrong or inadequate with the 
historical orientation and its methodological approach per se, 
when the orientation/approach is adequately taken as one of 
a number of alternative orientations/approaches, instead of 
the exclusive one, and when one can see its limitations in 
serving other distinct purposes in comparative studies. In view 
of this, one question would be natural: Are there any 
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orientations and approaches other than the historical 
orientation that would be adequate, and, more importantly, 
necessary in view of certain purposes in comparative studies? 
With a positive answer to the question actually being 
presupposed in the preceding discussion, the question can 
be phrased in another way : How are other legitimate 
orientations and methodological approaches possible and 
necessar y? In the following two sections, I will focus on two 
other orientations and their respective methodological 
approaches. 
2. Interpretation-concerned orientation aiming at 
understanding and elaborating 
The second orientation in comparative studies is concertned 
with interpretation4 through elaborating a thinker’s ideas under 
examination; the primar y concer n, or purpose, of this 
orientation is to enhance our understanding of a thinker ’s ideas 
via some effective conceptual and explanator y resources, 
whether or not those resources were actually used by the 
thinker herself. It is clear that a purely historical approach does 
not fit here: To elaborate and understand the thinker does not 
amount to figuring out exactly how the thinker actually thought; 
instead, such interpretation and understanding might include 
the interpreter’s elaboration of the implications of the thinker’s 
point, which might not have been considered by the thinker 
herself, or the interpreter’s representation of the thinker ’s point 
in clearer and more coherent ter ms or in a more 
philosophically interesting way, which the thinker herself might 
have not actually adopted. In both cases, given a thinker’s ideas 
(in one tradition or account) under interpretation, some 
effective conceptual and explanator y resources well 
developed in another tradition or account are consciously used 
to enhance our understanding of, and elaborate, the thinker ’s 
ideas; those resources used are thus tacitly and implicitly, but 
constructively, in comparison and contrast to those original 
resources by means of which the insight or vision was 
somehow delivered, insofar as such comparison of the two 
distinct sorts of resources is not expressly and directly 
conducted. The term ‘constructively ’ here means such tacit 
comparative approach intrinsically involves how the 
interpreter of the thinker ’s ideas could learn from another 
tradition or account regarding resources to enhance the 
interpreter ’s understanding of the thinker ’s ideas; therefore, 
some constructive philosophical engagement between distinct 
resources in different traditions is tacitly involved in this 
orientation and its corresponding methodological approach.5 
In this way, the so-called over-use of external resources 
is not necessarily a sin but might really enhance our 
understanding of a thinker ’s ideas or clarify some original 
unclear or confusing expression of her ideas. Consequently, 
the endeavor per se of using exter nal resources in this 
orientation is not automatically inappropriate and thus is not 
doomed to be a sin, as it would be in the historical orientation. 
As indicated in discussing the historical orientation, ‘blurring’ 
assimilation might result from ‘over’-use of external resources 
when interpreting one or both parties under comparative 
examination, especially when the external resources used to 
characterize one party come from the other party. But, for the 
purpose of interpretation, the resulting assimilation is not 
necessarily a sin but might illuminate the essential connection 
and common points between the assimilated ideas at the 
fundamental level so as to enhance our understanding of those 
ideas. 
It is clear that a comparative project with the 
interpretation-concerned orientation, instead of the historical 
orientation, is free or tends to be focusing on, and elaborating, 
a certain aspect, layer or dimension of a thinker ’s ideas based 
on the purpose of the project, the reflective interest of the 
person who carries out the project, etc. Indeed, instead of a 
comprehensive coverage of all aspects or dimensions of the 
object of study, focusing on one aspect or dimension is a kind 
of simplification. Now the question is this: Is any simplification 
per se doomed to be indiscriminately a sin of over­
simplification? It should be clear that, if the purpose of a 
comparative project is to focus on interpreting or elaborating 
one aspect or dimension instead of pretending to give a 
comprehensive historical description, charging the practitioner 
of this project with over-simplification or doing something 
excessive in simplifying the coverage into one aspect or 
dimension would be both unfair and miss the point. 
Let us agree that a comparative project should be guided 
by some comprehensive understanding. But a comparative 
project taking a certain methodological perspective through 
focusing on one aspect of the object of study is not 
incompatible with a comprehensive understanding. At this 
point, what needs to be recognized is an important distinction 
between a methodological perspective as working approach 
and the methodological guiding principle that an agent 
presupposes when taking the methodological perspective and 
that would be used by the agent to guide or regulate how the 
perspective would be applied and evaluated. One’s reflective 
practice per se of taking a certain methodological perspective 
amounts to neither reflectively rejecting some other relevant 
methodological perspective(s) nor presupposing an 
inadequate methodological guiding principle which would 
render irrelevant other relevant methodological perspectives 
(if any).6 
We have discussed three ‘sins’ (i.e., ‘over-simplification,’ 
‘over-use of external resources,’ and ‘blurring assimilation’) 
that might be charged against a comparative project with the 
interpretation-concerned orientation. How about the other 
one, the sin of ‘exaggerated distinction’? This case is more 
complicated than it may appear. This sin, as discussed before, 
is connected with the sin of over-simplification when the 
comparative project assumes the historical orientation. But 
when a comparative project takes the interpretation-
concerned orientation and does ‘simplify’ the object of study 
by focusing on one aspect of the object of study, is it 
automatically guilty of the sin of ‘exaggerated distinction’? The 
preceding distinction between the methodological perspective 
and the methodological guiding principle is helpful here again. 
What is at issue is whether the interpreter has assumed an 
adequate methodological guiding principle to guide and 
regulate how to look at the relation between the current 
methodological perspective used as a working perspective and 
other relevant methodological perspective(s) that would point 
to other aspects of the object of study. Consequently, when 
one evaluates a comparative project, what really matters is 
for one to look at what kind of methodological guiding principle 
is presupposed behind the working perspective; only when 
this is examined can the charge of ‘exaggerated distinction’ 
be adequately evaluated. 
3. Philosophical-issue-concerned orientation aiming 
at joint contribution 
The primary purpose of this orientation in comparative studies 
is to see how both sides under comparative examination could 
jointly and constructively contribute to some commonly 
concerned issues of philosophy,7 rather than to focus on 
providing a historical account of each or on interpreting some 
ideas historically developed in a certain tradition or account. 
Typically, in comparatively addressing a certain commonly 
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concer ned issue of philosophy, some substantial ideas 
historically developed in distinct philosophical traditions or 
accounts are explicitly and directly compared with the aim of 
showing how they could jointly contribute to the common 
concern in complementar y ways.8  Insofar as constructive 
engagement in dealing with various common concerns and 
issues of philosophy is most philosophically interesting, this 
comparative orientation and its methodological strategy 
directly, explicitly and constructively conducts philosophical 
engagement and is thus considered to be most philosophically 
interesting. To highlight the characteristic features of a 
comparative project with this primar y orientation, let us 
examine the appropriateness of three charges, among the 
aforementioned four, that have been sometimes or even often 
brought against comparative projects with this orientation, that 
is, the ‘sin’ of oversimplification, the ‘sin’ of over-use of external 
resources, and the ‘sin’ of blurring assimilation. 
A typical procedure of conducting a philosophical 
engagement in such comparative projects could be both 
conceptually and practically divided into three phases: (i) the 
pre-engagement phase in which certain ideas in different 
traditions or accounts that are relevant to the common concern 
under examination and thus to the purpose of the project are 
focused on and identified; (ii) the engagement phase in which 
those ideas internally engage with each other in view of that 
common concern and the purpose to be served; and (iii) the 
post-engagement phase in which those distinct ideas from 
different sources are now absorbed or assimilated into a new 
approach to the common concern under examination. The 
three ‘sins’ aforementioned may be considered to be typically 
associated with different phases. The ‘sin’ of over­
simplification regarding a certain idea identified from a certain 
tradition may be typically associated with reflective efforts in 
the pre-engagement phase; the ‘sin’ of over-use of external 
resources regarding elaborating a certain idea from a certain 
tradition may be typically associated with reflective efforts in 
the engagement phase; and the ‘sin’ of blurring assimilation 
may be typically associated with reflective efforts in the post-
engagement phase. Now let me briefly evaluate the 
appropriateness of the three ‘sins’ respectively in the 
corresponding three phases; looking at the ‘sins’ in this way 
will help to highlight features of comparative projects primarily 
with the philosophical-issue-concerned orientation. 
(1) In the pre-engagement phase, it might be not only 
legitimate but also adequate or even necessar y to have 
simplification and abstraction of some ideas in one tradition 
or account into such a perspective: this perspective per se is 
presented in most relevant terms to the common concern 
addressed, and the purpose ser ved in an issue-concerned 
comparative project, while without involving those irrelevant 
elements in the tradition or account from which such a 
perspective comes, though those irrelevant elements in that 
tradition might be relevant to figuring out the point of those 
ideas. The reasons are these. First, the primary concern of the 
project is not with how such an idea is related to the other 
elements in the source tradition or account but with how it is 
relevant to approaching the commonly concer ned 
philosophical issue. Second, while one needs to understand 
the point of an idea in the context in which it was raised, once 
one understands the point (either through employing data 
provided by projects with the first two orientations or through 
one’s own background project with one of the first two 
orientations), there would be no present purpose served by 
discussing background. Third, it is clear that such an approach 
per se does not imply denying the social and historical integrity 
of the idea in the source tradition; the point is that the existence 
of such integrity cannot automatically guarantee an 
indiscriminate priority or even relevance of expressly 
addressing it in any comparative projects without regard to 
their orientations and purposes. 
(2) In the engagement phase, relevant perspectives from 
different source traditions would constructively engage each 
other. From each party ’s point of view, the other party is 
something exter nal without; but, from a more broadly 
philosophical vantage point and in view of the commonly 
concerned issue, the distinct views may be complementary 
within. In this context, the term ‘external’ would miss the point 
in regard to the purpose here: the pivotal point is not this or 
that distinct perspective but the issue (and its comprehensive 
approach) to whose various aspects those perspectives point; 
in view of the issue, all those perspectives are internal in the 
sense that they would be complementar y and indispensable 
to a comprehensive understanding. 
(3) In the post-engagement phase, some sort of 
assimilation typically results from the preceding constructive 
engagement; that is, such assimilation would adjust, blur and 
absorb different perspectives into one new approach as a 
whole; this would be what is really expected in this sort of 
constructive engagement in comparative studies, instead of a 
sin. 
It should be noted that, if a comparative project that 
explicitly has one of the preceding orientations is considered 
as a project-simplex in comparative studies, a comparative 
project in philosophical practice might be a complex that goes 
with a combination of two or more orientations.9  For example, 
a comparative project concerned with an historical figure often 
consists of such a combination. Recognition of the 
characteristic features of the above three distinct comparative 
orientations and their respective methodological approaches 
would help us discriminatively treat different stages or parts 
of a comparative project-complex. 
4. Due emphasis on philosophical engagement in 
comparative studies 
Traditionally, to my knowledge, comparative projects with the 
above third and second orientations (especially when resorting 
to contemporar y development and resources of philosophy) 
have yet to receive due emphasis for some reasons. First, as 
far as comparative projects regarding Chinese and Western 
philosophies are concerned, a comparative project tends to 
be taken as a mere by-product or extension of studies of the 
classical Chinese philosophy which itself sometimes tends to 
be taken largely as merely historical studies of the history of 
(the classical) Chinese philosophy. Second, on the other hand, 
comparative approach as a methodological approach has not 
yet been considered primarily as an effective approach to doing 
philosophy per se. Third, the aforementioned four ‘sins’ 
(especially, those of ‘oversimplification,’ ‘over-use of external 
resources’ and ‘blurring-assimilation’) have been more or less 
considered as some taken-for-granted ‘sins’ and have thus 
discouraged reflective efforts in the direction of the third 
orientation (or even the second orientation) which would often 
unavoidably but appropriately commit those ‘sins’ in many 
cases. Fourth, most importantly, Chinese philosophy and 
Western philosophy (especially its mainstream traditions) are 
sometimes taken as being essentially alien to one another; 
this kind of mentality would undermine or preempt any serious 
reflective efforts in comparative projects with the third 
orientation and, in my opinion, negatively contribute to 
prejudice. Western philosophers as well as some scholars in 
studies of Chinese and comparative philosophy may assume 
that Chinese philosophy is not philosophy in the sense of the 
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term ‘philosophy ’ that is intrinsically related to a series of in Bo Mou ed. Two Roads to Wisdom?—Chinese and Analytic 
fundamental concerns and issues as addressed in Western Philosophical Traditions (Chicago: Open Court, 2001), pp.337-64. 
philosophy (especially its mainstream traditions). 
Now, as more and more philosophers in the fields of 
Chinese and comparative philosophy have a holistic 
understanding of Western philosophy (both its past and its 
contemporar y development, both its appearance and its deep 
concerns, and both its distinct working perspectives and its 
guiding principles at a deep level) and become constructively 
engaged with Western philosophy on a series of fundamental 
common concerns and issues, it is more widely agreed among 
philosophers who are familiar with both Chinese and Western 
philosophies that they are not essentially alien to one another: 
they have common concerns with a series of fundamental 
issues in philosophy and have taken their characteristic 
approaches to them. They thus could learn from each other 
and jointly contribute to the common philosophical enterprise 
through constructive dialogue and engagement. Consequently, 
there is serious need to emphasize comparative projects of 
the third and second orientations, though this emphasis 
certainly would not deny the legitimacy or value of the first 
orientation as one effective approach but stress its constructive 
compatibility with the other orientations.10, 11 
Notes 
1. By ‘comparative philosophy ’ I mean not merely comparative studies 
of different philosophical traditions but any comparative investigation 
concerning distinct modes of thinking, methodological approaches 
(perspectives, guiding principles or instruments) or substantial points 
of view in different traditions or within the same tradition, though I 
sometimes cite philosophical traditions to illustrate relevant points. 
2. Because of space limitation, I cannot give detailed examples in 
the text to illustrate my theoretical points regarding those orientations 
and methodological approaches under discussion; instead, in the 
endnotes, I will refer the reader to my relevant writings in comparative 
studies that either illustrate my points here or provide more 
explanations. 
3. By ‘external resources’ I mean those resources that were not 
actually used by the ancient thinker under discussion when the 
resources are identified from the historical point of view or with the 
historical orientation. Nevertheless, as I explain later, using the ver y 
term ‘external’ in some situations would simply miss the point in 
regard to the purpose of the third orientation to be discussed. 
4. In this article, I use the ter m ‘interpretation’ in a nar row or 
straightforward sense as specified here (in terms of elaborating and 
understanding) rather than in a broad or implicit sense in which all 
the three orientations discussed here could be somehow identified 
as ‘interpretation-concerned’. 
5. For example, one can interpret the point of the Yin-Yang way of 
thinking delivered in the Yi-Jing text or the point of the opening 
passage of the Dao-De-Jing by taking such a comparative approach 
and consciously employing some conceptual and explanator y 
resources of contemporar y philosophy to interpret some central 
message of the Yi-Jing text or Lao Zi’s central message in the opening 
passage of the Dao-De-Jing. For my own interpretations of both taking 
this kind of comparative approach, which illustrate points in this paper, 
see Bo Mou, “ Werden-Sein Komplementarität: Die Yin-Yang -
Metaphysische Sicht des Yijing,” Polylog: Zeitschrift für interkulturelles 
Philosophieren, 7 (2001), pp. 42-51 and Bo Mou, “Ultimate Concerns 
and L anguage Engagement: A Re-Examination of the Opening 
Message of the Dao-De-Jing,” The Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 
27, no. 4 (2000), pp. 429-39. [A substantial expansion of the latter 
article, “Eternal Dao, Constant Names, and Language Engagement,” 
appears in Bo Mou, ed. Comparative Approaches to Chinese 
Philosophy (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002)]. 
6. For a detailed and systematic discussion of the distinction between 
the methodological perspective and the methodological guiding 
principle and its implications, see Bo Mou, “An Analysis of the Structure 
of Philosophical Methodology—in View of Comparative Philosophy,” 
7. It is arguably right that many issues that were traditionally identified 
as ‘unique’ issues in different traditions have tur ned out to be 
concerned primarily with different aspects, layers or dimensions of 
some commonly concerned, more general issues of philosophy, 
especially from a more broadly philosophical vantage point. This is 
one point that I have endeavored to make and illustrate in my several 
writings mentioned in the endnotes. 
8. For example, we can examine how, say, Dewey and Laozi could 
jointly contribute to the issue of the nature and function of moral rules 
and the related issue of the nature and function of moral experience 
in certain complementar y ways. For a detailed discussion of this to 
illustrate points advanced in this paper, see Bo Mou, “Moral Rules 
and Moral Experience: A comparative analysis of Dewey and Laozi 
on morality,” Asian Philosophy, Vol. 11, no. 3 (2001), pp. 161-78. 
9. For an illustration of what I mean by ‘a comparative project-
complex,’ interested readers might look at my article “The Structure 
of Chinese Language and Ontological Insights: A Collective-Noun 
Hypothesis” (Philosophy East and West, Vol. 49, No. 1 (1999), pp. 45­
62) in which the three orientations under examination are combined 
together and interplay. 
10. As a collective effort to meet such need, the International Society 
for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy (ISCWP) 
has been recently established. With its general purpose of promoting 
comparative studies of Chinese and Wester n philosophy and 
facilitating academic contact and exchange of ideas and information 
among interested scholars, the ISCWP (i) emphasizes (but is not 
limited to) the constructive engagement between Chinese philosophy 
and Wester n mainstream philosophy (analytic and continental 
traditions in their broad senses), (ii) stresses the sensitivity of such 
comparative studies to contemporar y development and resources of 
philosophy and their mutual advancement, and (iii) through the 
characteristic path of comparative studies of Chinese and Western 
philosophy, strives to contribute to philosophy as common human 
wealth as well as to respective studies of Chinese philosophy and 
Wester n philosophy. As one effort in this direction, an ISCWP 
international conference “Philosophical Engagement: Davidson’s 
Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy ” will be held (for details, see “Call 
for Papers” for this conference on the APA website, 
www.apa.udel.edu/apa/opportunities/conferences/2003/jul/ 
iscwp.html). 
11. I am grateful to Chad Hansen, Douglas Heenslee, Chen-yang Li, 
You-zheng Li and Xiang-long Zhang for their helpful comments and 
criticism of an early version of this article. 
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